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Summary
Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, together with Iraqi
long-range missile development and support for terrorism, are the primary
justifications put forward for military action.  On March 17, 2003 President Bush
issued an ultimatum demanding that Saddam Hussein and his sons depart from Iraq
within 48 hours.  On March 19, offensive operations began with air strikes against
Iraqi leadership positions.
Offensive operations combine an air offensive with advancing elements of four
armored, mechanized, airborne, and Marine divisions. It is a smaller force than the
1991 Desert Storm operation, reflecting an assessment that Iraqi armed forces are
neither as numerous nor as capable as they were ten years ago, and that U.S. forces
are significantly more capable.  This size force was generally considered to offer
greater certainty than lighter ground force options for a rapid victory against
significant Iraqi resistance.  As the U.S. ground offensive approaches Baghdad, DOD
civilian leadership has come under criticism for not permitting the deployment of
sufficient U.S. ground forces to maintain the offensive, protect lines of supply, and
secure rear areas where Iraqi resistance continues.  U.S. Central Command maintains
that offensive operations are “on track”, but have begun to acknowledge that Iraqi
resistance is stronger than anticipated.  The air attacks on Baghdad and Republican
Guard units have intensified, as allied ground forces have focused on  reconsolidation
and securing rear areas. The most significant unknowns remain the intensity of Iraqi
resistance within and around Baghdad, and whether chemical or biological weapons
(CBW) will be employed. To date, no CBW munitions have been found.  Contrary
to Administration expectations, the invasion has not generated significant anti-regime
activities among the Iraqi population.
Though press reports differ somewhat, and DOD has not released official
figures, it appears that over 300,000 U.S. military personnel are in the Persian Gulf
region (ashore and afloat) or en route. Ground forces include  the 3rd Infantry
Division, the 101st Airborne Division, the 7th Cavalry Regiment, and the 1st Marine
Expeditionary Force.  Three other Army divisions are en route or on alert for
deployment.  The U.S. Navy has deployed six aircraft carrier battle groups.  The Air
Force has about 15 air wings in the region, and strategic bombers are operating from
the British airbase at Diego Garcia, and airbases in the Middle East, Europe , and the
United States.  (See CRS Report RL317563, Iraq: A Summary of U.S. Forces.) The
United Kingdom has deployed an task force of approximately 47,000 troops.
Australia has deployed 2,000 troops, and 200 Polish special operations forces are also
engaged. Key arrangements for the use of regional military facilities are in place with
Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman.  Saudi Arabia is permitting use of air command
centers and Turkey has granted overflight rights. (See CRS Report RL31799, Iraq
Foreign Stances Toward US. Policy).
The Administration has submitted a $62.6 billion FY2003 DOD supplemental
appropriation request for expenses related to military operations in Iraq.
This report will be updated as events warrant.
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1 President Bush’s Address to the U.N. General Assembly, September 12, 2002.
Iraq: U.S. Military Operations
Background
Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, together with Iraqi
long-range missile development, and support for terrorism are the primary
justifications put forward by the Bush Administration for military action. Since Iraq
originally ended cooperation with U.N. inspectors in 1998, there has been little
information on the state of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) arsenal;
however, Administration officials are convinced that Iraq has reconstituted
significant capabilities.  Initially, leading Administration officials, most notably Vice-
President Cheney, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, and his Deputy Paul Wolfowitz,
stressed that “regime change” or the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. Later
in 2002, WMD disarmament was emphasized as the primary objective.  Expanding
on this theme, President Bush, in his speech before the United Nations on September
12, 2002 specified  the following conditions for Iraq to  meet to forestall military
action against it:
! Immediately and unconditionally forswear, disclose, and remove or
destroy all weapons of mass destruction, long-range missiles, and all
related material.
! End all support for terrorism and act to suppress it.
! Cease persecution of its civilian population.
! Release or account for all Gulf War missing personnel.
! End all illicit trade outside the oil-for-food program and allow
United Nations administration of its funds.1
On March 17, 2003 President Bush issued an ultimatum demanding that
Saddam Hussein and his sons depart from Iraq within 48 hours.  On March 19,
offensive operations commenced with air strikes against Iraqi leadership positions.
Military Planning and Operations
The Department of Defense officially released limited official information
concerning war planning or preparations against Iraq prior to the onset of offensive
operations.  There were, however, frequent and significant news leaks which
provided a range of details.  News reports indicated that the military options that
were under discussion varied significantly in their assumptions regarding Iraq
military capabilities, the usefulness of Iraqi opposition groups, the attitude of regional
governments, and the U.S. military resources that would be required.
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Options Considered
In the wake of the successful operations in Afghanistan against the Taliban,
some  Administration officials advocated a similar operation, entailing use of special
operations forces in cooperation with indigenous Iraqi opposition forces, coupled
with an extensive air offensive to destroy Hussein’s most reliable Republican Guard
units, command & control centers, and WMD capabilities.  This approach assumed
that the regular Iraqi army would prove unreliable, and could  even join opposition
forces once it is clear that defeat is imminent. To encourage this, significant emphasis
would be placed on an intensive psychological warfare or “psyops” campaign to
undermine the morale of Iraqi soldiers and unit commanders, persuading them of the
hopelessness of resistance.2
While having the advantage of not requiring large staging areas (though some
regional air basing would be required) or months to prepare, this was generally
considered the riskiest approach.  The weakness of Iraqi opposition military forces
and their competing political agendas place their effectiveness in question, and
predicting the behavior of regular Iraqi Army units under attack is problematic.  This
option also did not address the possibility of stiff resistance by Republican Guard
units in the environs of Baghdad, nor the troop requirements of a post-conflict
occupation.
This “lite” option stood in contrast to the operations plan originally offered by
U.S. Central Command. This option, often called the “Franks Plan”, after Army Gen.
Tommy Franks, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) commander who first
briefed it to the President, calls for a large-scale ground force invasion.   News
reports initially indicated, however, that this “heavy” approach did not receive the
support of the DOD civilian leadership or White House advisors.  Questions over the
reliability of the regional support that would be necessary for staging areas and the
length of time required for deployment were the major concerns.3  However, the
White House rejection of the “Franks Plan” came prior to the decision to take the Iraq
issue to the United Nations Security Council.  When it became clear that Security
Council deliberations and the re-introduction of U.N. inspectors to Iraq could delay
the possibility of military action for several months, it was apparently decided that
this interlude would allow time both to negotiate regional cooperation and to deploy
more substantial forces to the Persian Gulf region, and military operations today
appear to adhere closer to CENTCOM’s original recommendations.  As the ground
force offensive has slowed, however, there is now increasing criticism of DOD’s
civilian leadership for not permitting the deployment of even more ground forces
prior to onset of operations.4
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Current Operations
Current offensive operations combine an air offensive and simultaneous ground
offensive, in contrast to the 1991 campaign which saw weeks of air attacks to soften
Iraqi resistance. U.S. Central Command’s operational plan is employing a smaller
ground force than the 1991 Desert Storm operation, reflecting an assessment that
Iraqi armed forces are neither as numerous nor as capable as they were ten years ago,
and that U.S. forces are significantly more capable.  This option is greatly dependent
upon the continued cooperation of regional nations for substantial staging
areas/airbases and has required months to deploy the necessary forces. 
Though press reports differ somewhat, it appears that over 300,000 U.S. military
personnel are in the Persian Gulf region (ashore and afloat) and more  en route.
Currently the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division, the 7th Cavalry Regiment, and the 1st
Marine Expeditionary Force form the bulk of the U.S. ground offensive.  The 101st
Airborne Division (Air Assault) has deployed from Kuwait to advance bases in Iraq.
The 4th Mechanized Infantry Division has not arrived in theater.   Ships bearing its
equipment remained off Turkey for weeks awaiting the outcome of negotiations to
permit establishing a northern front attacking from Turkey, and then were diverted
to the Persian Gulf when these negotiations fell through.  It is anticipated that it will
be mid- April before the 4th Infantry will be ready to enter action. The 1st Cavalry
Division, 1st Armored Division, and 1st Mechanized Infantry Division have all been
alerted for deployment, but reportedly most elements of these divisions still remain
at home bases in Europe and the United States.  Some elements of the 1st Air Cavalry
have already deployed, given that a AH-64 Apache helicopter recently downed
displayed 1st Air Cavalry insignia.  The U.S. Navy has deployed six of its twelve
naval aircraft carrier battle groups.  The Air Force now has approximately 15 air
wings operating in the region.  Strategic bombers are operating from the British
airbase at Diego Garcia, and airbases in the Middle East, Europe , and the United
States.  The United Kingdom has deployed over 47,000 personnel, including a naval
task force, an armored task force, a Royal Marine brigade, a parachute brigade, a
Special Air Service regiment, and a Special Boat Squadron.  The majority of these
British forces are engaged in southeastern Iraq, securing the Umm Qasr and Basra
region. Australia has deployed approximately 2,000 personnel, including special
operations personnel in western Iraq, and one F/A-18 attack aircraft squadron.
Poland has 200 special operations troops around Basra.  (For more detailed
information,  see CRS Report RL317563, Iraq: A Summary of U.S. Forces and CRS
Report RL31799, Iraq Foreign Stances Toward US. Policy)
The invasion of Iraq was expected to begin with a 72-96 hour air offensive to
paralyze the Iraqi command structure, and demoralize Iraqi resistance across the
military-civilian spectrum. Intelligence reports indicating the possibility of striking
Saddam Hussein and his immediate circle led to an acceleration of the operations
plan,  and an almost simultaneously onset of air and ground offensive operations.
CENTCOM air commanders have stressed that significant efforts will continue to be
made to minimize civilian casualties and damage to Iraqi physical infrastructure.
In the twelve days of the offensive, some U.S. ground force elements have
reached well within 100 miles of Baghdad, and secured three bridgeheads over the
Euphrates river.  They pursued a strategy of rapid advance, by-passing urban centers
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when possible, pausing only when encountering Iraqi resistance.  CENTCOM
spokesmen have characterized Iraqi resistance as sporadic and uncohesive. Oilfields
and port facilities in southern Iraq have been secured, as have two air bases in
western Iraq.  Though a few oil wells were set afire, there has been no widespread
environmental sabotage. Allied forces have not encountered the mass surrenders
characteristic of the 1991 campaign, however DOD reports that over 3,500 Iraqis
have been taken prisoner, and believes that many more have simply deserted their
positions. Iraqi paramilitary forces, particularly the Saddam Fedayeem, have engaged
in guerrilla-style attacks from urban centers in the rear areas, but have reportedly not
inflicted significant damage.  Nevertheless, greater attention than anticipated is
having to be paid to protecting extended supply lines, and securing these urban
centers, particularly around an-Nasiriyah and and Najaf, and in the British sector
around Umm Qasr and Basra. The anticipated support for the invasion from the Shiia
population in southern Iraq has not developed.
Though CENTCOM commanders continue to express confidence in the
adequacy of their force structure in theater, the Iraqi attacks in rear areas and the
length of the supply lines to forward units have led some to suggest that insufficient
ground forces are in place to continue the offensive while securing rear areas and
ensuring uninterrupted logistical support.  These critics fault DOD civilian leadership
for overestimating the effectiveness of a precision air offensive and curtailing the
deployment of more ground troops, suggesting that an ideological commitment to
smaller ground forces and greater reliance on high-tech weaponry has dominated
military planning.5
Without permission to use Turkish territory, CENTCOM was unable to carry
out an early ground offensive in Northern Iraq.  Special operations forces are
operating with Kurdish irregulars near Kirkuk, and the U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade
has deployed to the area. Although it is possible that Afghanistan-style operations
using special forces and Kurdish troops could be mounted against the oil-rich Kirkuk
region, CENTCOM and Pentagon spokesmen have been noticeably reticent about
current or planned operations in the north.  So far allied operations in the north
appear to be a holding action, while reinforcements are awaited.  Complicating the
situation in the north, has been the Turkish desire to possibly augment the 8,000+
troops it has had stationed in Kurdish-held territory in order to block possible
Kurdish refugees and influence the accommodations made to the Kurds in a post-
conflict Iraq.  Turkish miliary spokesmen have indicated that no additional Turkish
forces will move into Iraq at this time.
As U.S. ground forces are now focused on securing rear areas, re-supplying,
and consolidating units around Baghdad,  the air offensive has intensified on
Baghdad and Republican Guard positions.  It appears also that the target list in and
around Baghdad has been expanded, though efforts continue to limit civilian
casualties and  damage to the critical infrastructure of the country.  The primary focus
of the air campaign has been on command/communication installations, leadership
facilities, and air defenses.  Though suffering degradation, some Baghdad air
defenses remain and  Iraqi command and control systems retain some capability.
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Two attacks on Iraqi domestic television broadcast centers have resulted in only
temporary outages.
At this point, the success of the air offensive in breaking the will and ability of
the Iraqi forces to resist will determine whether coalition forces will have to subject
Baghdad to a lengthy siege or initiate urban operations into the city.  This will be a
critical juncture, because both options present the probability of increased civilian
casualties and a greater political backlash within Iraq and internationally.
There are press reports that intelligence sources indicate that release authority
for the use of chemical and biological weapons has been issued to regional
subordinate commanders.6   The most significant unknowns remain the extent and
intensity of Iraqi resistance around and within Baghdad, and whether chemical or
biological weapons will be employed.
Factors for Consideration
Roles and Attitudes of Other Nations7
On March 18, the State Department released a list of thirty nations whom it
characterizes as having “agreed to be part of the coalition for the immediate
disarmament of Iraq”.  The list includes those contributing combat units (noted
above), those offering basing or overflight rights, and those who simply “ want to be
publically associated with efforts to disarm Iraq” –  Afghanistan, Albania, Australia,
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Eritrea,
Estonia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Hungary, Italy, Japan (post conflict),Korea, Latvia,
Lithuania, Macedonia, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Philippines, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and Uzbekistan.  In addition to the
countries listed, the State Department stated that there are 15 countries who have
requested their support of military operations not be made public.8  On December 20,
Administration officials referred to 35 nations as members of the coalition, without
specifying nations.
The fluctuating international political environment regarding cooperation with
U.S. offensive operations against Iraq confronted military planners with complex
challenges. It has been suggested that some nations’  public opposition to military
action against Iraq does not reflect the nature of “private” diplomatic conversations
which indicate a greater willingness to support U.S. policy.  If true, this could result
in unacknowledged or covert assistance, or perhaps overt cooperation after a U.S.
victory appears assured.
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Saudi Arabia, a previous opponent of  military action, is permitting use of the
U.S. air command center located on its territory, and the use of other air force
facilities for non-strike aircraft (e.g., aerial tankers, search and rescue).  Saudi
cooperation will provide a very significant boon to military commanders, though
there  may be some concern over what role in military decision-making the Saudi
government may wish to play now that offensive operations are underway.9
Concerned that U.S. facilities in Saudi Arabia would not be available for full
operations against Iraq, the United States established defense agreements, and
expanded or upgraded airbase and logistics facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman,
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates – countries whose support of U.S. policy in the
region is judged the most reliable.10 Each of these countries permitted use of airbases
to support U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, while Saudi Arabia allowed only
the use of the air operations command center on its territory.  Given the range of
facilities and prepositioned U.S. equipment in these countries, their continued
cooperation will be crucial to the military offensive against Iraq. The extent of
cooperation from these nations was thought to probably greatly depend upon the
results of U.N. arms inspections and the further approval of the U.N. Security
Council.  However, with the onset of conflict, there appears to be no diminution of
support for U.S. operations.
 The United States and Bahrain have a defense cooperation agreement regarding
prepositioning war materiel.  The U.S. Navy 5th Fleet headquarters is in Bahrain, and
the Air Force currently has use of Bahrain’s Shaikh airbase.  Since the Gulf War, the
United States has maintained a troop presence in Kuwait and it is serving as the main
staging area for coalition ground forces. The U.S. Air Force has use of two Kuwaiti
airfields – Ali al Salem and Ali al-Jabiru.  In Oman, through a cooperative
agreement, the Air Force has access to four airbases – al-Musnanah, Masirah, Seeb,
and Thumrait – which it has been upgrading to handle a full range of air operations.
Qatar has developed a very close cooperative defense relationship with the United
States, permitting the prepositioning of enough equipment for three U.S. Army
brigades and the construction of an operations command center at al-Udaid airbase
comparable to that located at Prince Sultan airbase in Saudi Arabia.  This facility has
been extensively used to support operations in Afghanistan, and Central Command
Headquarters deployed there in mid-September, 2002.   In the United Arab Emirates,
the U.S. Navy has access to port facilities and the Air Force is using the al-Dhafra
airbase. 11
The attitude of the Turkish government towards U.S. military action against Iraq
was a very important consideration for U.S. military planners.  The Turkish
parliament’s  rejection of a proposal allowing U.S. ground troops to operate from
Turkey delivered a setback to CENTCOM planners,  though  CENTCOM spokesmen
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have downplayed the impact of the Turkish decision upon their prospects for a
successful operation.12  Turkey has granted only overflight rights, and will not permit
basing or offensive operations from its soil.   As noted, the  4th Mechanized Infantry
Division, originally intended to attack from Turkey, is now being  diverted to Kuwait
as follow-on  support for ground units in the south of Iraq. There have been press
reports, however, that Turkey has facilitated U.S. upgrading of airfields located
inside northern Iraq.  Aside from permitting air operations from Incirlik and other
bases, Turkish cooperation would also have provided an easier approach for a
northern front for U.S. ground operations.   Now, it appears, that U.S. airborne and
air assault troops coming from Kuwait may be assigned this mission. Though very
difficult, mountainous terrain presents challenges in this area, if the United States
intends to coopt the indigenous Kurdish opposition forces as part of its attack
strategy, a significant troop presence in northern Iraq is crucial. 
Improved U.S. Military Technology
Significant technological advancements, particularly in precision-guided
munitions, have led DOD spokesmen to emphasize that the air campaign against Iraq
will be considerably more efficient and more militarily devastating than Operation
Desert Storm.  In 1991 only ten percent of the aerial munitions used were precision-
guided.  That ratio could well be the inverse in the air campaign today.  This would
allow a greater number of targets to be destroyed far more rapidly, using fewer
aircraft and with less chance of collateral damage. The greater availability of
precision-guided munitions (PGMs) bodes well for attacks against stationary targets,
and moving targets in open terrain.  There have been some question raised about the
level of PGM inventories after the Afghanistan campaign, but DOD has insisted they
remain adequate for operations against Iraq.13 Major improvements have also been
achieved in the ability of the intelligence community to communicate targeting
information directly to combat platforms (e.g. attack aircraft, missile launchers) in
almost real time. Military operations in an urban environment would ,however, limit
the effectiveness of air power and armor units. Rules of target engagement and
avoidance of “friendly fire” casualties  remain prime concerns.
 U.S. military planners have paid particular attention to the problem of Iraqi
missiles.  In 1991, the allied coalition was unable to locate and destroy any SCUD
mobile launchers, and U.S. intelligence believes that Iraq still possesses at least 24
missiles, some possibly armed with chemical or biological warheads.  Using new
equipment, such as the Tactical Airborne Warning System (TAWS) and the PAC-3
air defense missiles,  DOD has  greatly reduced the time from missile launch
detection to intercept, improving the chance of both destroying the launched missile
and the missile launcher. Improvements in satellite reconnaissance, communications,
and unmanned aerial vehicles now available to ground commanders are also seen as
major advances over Desert Storm capabilities.  The PAC-3 air defense system has
so far worked well in Kuwait in intercepting the few Iraqi missiles which threatened
populated areas, though it has also downed a British fighter aircraft in a “friendly
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fire” incident.  Though initial reports indicated some of the Iraqi missiles were the
prohibited SCUDs, this identification was later retracted.
Iraqi Military Capabilities
Conventional Forces.  There is little disagreement that Iraqi armed forces
are significantly degraded from their condition during the Persian Gulf War in 1991.
Manpower stands at roughly 50% or less of its 1991 level or about 350,000-400,000.
Unclassified estimates put equipment levels at about 2,000-2,600 tanks, 3,700
armored vehicles, and 300 combat aircraft.14  A number of factors are believed to
hamper Iraqi military effectiveness.  A decade of arms embargo has resulted in much
equipment now being obsolete or inoperable.  Many of Iraq’s regular army divisions
are undermanned and all comprise mostly conscripts.  Large unit and combined arms
training is lacking, and combat experienced non-commissioned officers and
commanders are relatively few.  Logistical support is not robust, and is vulnerable
to air interdiction. 
Saddam Hussein’s fear of internal coups has served to make regime security a
paramount concern, which could have a detrimental effect on Iraq’s military
effectiveness.  The best equipped and most reliable troops, the Republican Guard,
are kept near Baghdad for regime protection.  The officer corps is subject to intense
scrutiny for loyalty and subject to unpredictable purges.  The distribution of
weaponry and supplies is curtailed among regular army units to forestall attempts to
overthrow the regime.  There also exist tensions, to some extent purposely
encouraged, between regular and Republican Guard units, which could hamper
coordination.15
These considerations notwithstanding, the Iraqi military still presents some
significant challenges for U.S. military planners. It cannot be assumed that a ground
campaign would be simply a replay of 1991's Operation Desert Storm. After that
experience when Iraqi units deployed in the open desert were subjected to devastating
air attacks, Iraq’s military leadership appears to be turning to an urban strategy to
reduce the effectiveness of U.S. airpower.  By choosing to defend primarily urban
centers, Iraq could force the United States to commit troops to urban combat – one
of the most difficult types to conduct – and simultaneously constrain U.S. Air Force
targeting because of concerns over collateral damage and casualties.  The Iraqi
government has shown no hesitation to locate military facilities in civilian areas to
exploit this concern.  Republican Guard units in the environs of Baghdad, as part of
their regime protection mission, have trained for urban combat, and could provide
significant resistance mingled with Baghdad’s population of 4 million.  There have
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been reports of underground tunnel systems in urban centers specifically designed to
facilitate urban defense.16
As operations have played out, Iraqi ground forces have generally remained in
fortified positions around and within urban centers, and have emphasized guerilla-
style attacks to harass and delay the U.S. advance.  Iraqi units that have attempted to
maneuver in the open have been successfully attacked by allied air forces
Chemical and Biological Weapons.  Iraq is believed to have possibly
retained chemical and biological stockpiles from before the Persian Gulf War, and
may have continued covert CBW development and/or production since.  Some CBW
facilities that were destroyed during the Persian Gulf War reportedly have been re-
built.  Iraq is known to have produced blister agents (“mustard gas”) and both
persistent and non-persistent nerve agents (VX and Sarin). Biological agents
produced include anthrax, aflatoxin, and the toxin agents botulinum and ricin.
Though unconfirmed, it is possible that Iraq may also possess the smallpox virus
cultured from natural outbreaks of the disease in Iraq prior to its world-wide
eradication in the early 1970s.  Iraq is known  to have developed a variety of means
to disseminate CBW, including bombs, artillery shells, missile warheads, mines,  and
aerial sprayers for both manned and unmanned aircraft.  There have been some
questions about the effectiveness of these delivery systems, but they remain
unanswered. 17
Though Iraq did not use CBW in the Persian Gulf War, many believe that
Saddam Hussein’s restraint in this regard will be not repeated.  This view is based on
the assumption that, given that the U.S. objective would now be the destruction of
his regime rather than the more limited objectives in the Persian Gulf War, Hussein
would have “nothing to lose” by their employment.  The actual use of these weapons
will rest ultimately, however, upon the military commanders who control them, and
U.S. planners are focusing on ways to persuade these officers that using CBW would
be suicidal.
To date, CENTCOM reports that no use of chemical or biological weapons has
been detected, and no CBW munitions have been discovered, though some stored
CW defensive equipment has been discovered.   Given that operational planning
called for suspected CBW sites to be among the first objectives to be seized or
neutralized, the apparent failure to find any of these weapons, though certainly
heartening to combat commanders, has led to questions about the Administration’s
assertions of Iraq’s CBW capabilities. Secretary Rumsfeld has noted, however, that
intelligence reports indicate a greater probability of encountering these weapons as
allied forces move closer to Baghdad.18 CENTCOM spokesmen have suggested that
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more extensive searches for these weapons will take place after offensive operations
have stabilized.19
Given that Iraqi employment of CB weapons remains an open question, U.S.
forces must be prepared to operate in a CB contaminated environment.  Though
perhaps better prepared than any other military to deal with CB warfare, U.S. forces
have not actually encountered the use of CB weapons since World War I.  U.S.
commanders have to ensure that there are adequate supplies of protective and
decontamination equipment for an invasion force, and are again be confronted with
the possibly problematic issue of vaccinations and prophylactic pharmaceuticals that
has led to the “Gulf War illnesses” controversy.  Indicative of this latter problem,
even though production of anthrax vaccine has been restored, DOD has still not re-
instated its service-wide vaccination policy. This concern may be compounded with
the smallpox vaccine.  In October 2002, the General Accounting Office reiterated its
concerns over “serious problems” in the adequacy of the armed forces CBW training,
availability of specialist personnel, and defensive equipment inventories 20   With
regard to GAO’s concerns over CBW suit defects, DOD spokesmen have noted that
troops deployed to the Persian Gulf have all been issued the newly-designed Joint
Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIT), which does not have the
manufacturing defects detected in some of the older Battle Dress Overgarment.21
One of the unique qualities of CB weapons is that the employment of even a
small number or amount can have an effect significantly out of proportion to the
casualties actually inflicted.  Trace amounts will force military units to “suit up” and
can severely degrade their performance. Logistics facilities (e.g. ports), often staffed
by unprotected civilians, could be shut down by relatively small amounts of
persistent nerve agent because the workforce refuses to return. Civilian ships
chartered for military transport are particularly vulnerable to threats of chemical or
biological attacks and, as occurred in the Persian Gulf War, civilian crews may refuse
to enter the war zone.  In short, the psychological effects of these weapons could
prove just  as disruptive as their physical effects.
The Bush Administration’s announced policy of possible nuclear retaliation if
WMD are used against U.S. forces may serve as a deterrent, as more veiled
references to nuclear force were felt to forestall their use in 1991.22  On the other
hand, the U.S. emphasis upon ousting Hussein could induce a “nothing to lose”
attitude conducive to using CB weapons.
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Post-War Requirements
In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on September 18,
2002  Defense Secretary Rumsfeld declined to speculate upon what might be the
military requirements for the United States in post-war Iraq, assuming Saddam
Hussein’s ouster.  On February 25, testifying before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, Army Chief of Staff. General Eric Shinseki  expressed the opinion that
up to “several hundred thousand” troops could be required to maintain an occupation
of Iraq.  This estimate was almost immediately dismissed by DOD’s civilian
leadership.23 This controversy reflects the great difficulty in predicting what the
political and military situation would be in a post-war Iraq, and how long a U.S.
military presence would be required before an acceptable and stable Iraqi government
could be established.  The reaction of the Iraq population is the key element, and will
depend upon a variety of factors, such as the nature and extent of war damage and
casualties, the demands of ethnic and religious minorities, and the speed with which
a credible government can be established.  Though a short-term post-war occupation
may be a possibility, given that so far the Iraqi population has not demonstrated an
acceptance of coalition forces, it is possible that a continued deployment of
substantial military ground force will be necessary for several years.  For comparison,
in the relatively benign environment and considerably smaller areas of Bosnia and
Kosovo, NATO currently maintains a deployment of about 60,000 troops.  It is
possible, however, that some nations unwilling to participate in military action
against Iraq may be willing to contribute to a post-war stabilization force, thus
alleviating some of the burden on U.S. forces.  Given the current international
political climate regarding U.S. military operations against Iraq, it is difficult to
estimate the possible extent of such assistance.
Other U.S. Military Resource Requirements
Aside from the deployments in the Balkans where the United States has about
12,000 troops, operations continue in Afghanistan where U.S. troops number about
7,000.  DOD has not released information on the current deployment situation for
U.S. Air Force units: however many air assets could possibly respond to operational
requirements for either Iraq or Afghanistan from their current bases, if aerial re-
fueling is possible.  While the Department of Defense can meet the overall manpower
requirements of an Iraqi invasion, an issue of particular concern is whether sufficient
“low density-high demand” assets are available.  These include assets such as aerial
re-fueling tankers,  the EA-6B aircraft used to engage air defense radars, the AWACS
and JSTARS reconnaissance/air control aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, Combat-
Air-Search  and rescue (CSAR), and all special operations forces (SOF).  Demands
on special operations forces have been particularly high  over the last year.  Most
notably in Afghanistan, but there have also been training/advisory missions in the
Philippines, Georgia (Gruzia),  and Yemen as part of a world-wide antiterrorism
campaign, in addition to anti-drug operations in Columbia.  And, Secretary Rumsfeld
indicated that he intends to increase further the SOF commitment to the war on
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terrorism .24 It is in this context, that some have suggested that the invasion of Iraq
is detracting from the resources available to continue efforts to pursue the world-wide
war on terrorism, which they view as currently a greater threat to U.S. security than
Iraq.25
North Korea’s decision in December 2002 to resume its nuclear weapons
program has raised tensions in that region, and brought attention to the question
whether the United States would and/or could take military action there, in addition
to a campaign in Iraq.  Secretary Rumsfeld has asserted that U.S. military resources
are sufficient to fight in two theaters simultaneously, though some observers have
strongly disagreed, citing shortages of strategic air/sealift and active duty personnel.26
At a minimum, the situation on the Korean Peninsula may mean that Pacific
Command forces that may have otherwise deployed to the Persian Gulf will have to
remain in the Pacific region. Meanwhile, the Bush Administration has stressed it is
seeking a diplomatic rather than military resolution to the North Korean situation.
Costs27
Predicting the cost of military operations is a task that DOD did not undertake
prior to the peace-keeping deployments to the Balkans, and it remains a highly
conjectural exercise.  Methodologies tend to be relatively crude and based upon
historical experience, i.e. “the last war”.  Though initially Secretary Rumsfeld
expressed his opinion that “it is unknowable what a war or conflict like that would
cost”, in early 2003 he estimated a cost of under $50 billion.  Other  DOD officials
anticipated an $80-85 billion cost, assuming a 6-month follow-on occupation.28
On March 25, 2003 The Administration submitted a $74.7 billion FY2003
supplemental appropriations request, of which $62.6 billion is for Department of
Defense expenses related to the war in Iraq through September 2003.  Specifically,
this request includes funds for preparatory costs incurred, costs associated with
military operations, replenishing munitions, and funds to support other nations.  The
Administration stated that this supplemental request “ is built on the key assumption
that U.S. military action in Iraq will be swift and decisive.”29
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 Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution, has pegged a 250,000-strong
invasion at between $40-$50 billion with a follow-up occupation costing $10-$20
billion a year.  Former White House economic advisor Lawrence Lindsay has
estimated the high limit on the cost to be 1-2% of GNP, or about $100-$200 billion.
Mitch Daniels, Director of the Office of Management and Budget subsequently
discounted this estimate as “very, very high”, and has stated that the costs would be
between$50-$60 billion, though no specific supporting figures were provided for the
estimate.30   In its most recent cost estimate, the Congressional Budget Office put
deployment costs at about $14 billion, with combat operations costing $10 billion for
the first month and $8 billion a month thereafter. CBO cited the cost of returning
combat forces to home bases at $9 billion,  and the costs of continued occupation of
Iraq to run between $1-4 billion.31
The American Academy of Arts and Sciences has published a much  more wide-
ranging report which covers the possibility of an extended occupation, in addition to
potential long-term economic consequences and concludes that potential costs could
range from $99 billion to $1.2 trillion.32  For comparison, the cost to the United
States of the Persian Gulf War in 1990-91 was approximately $60 billion, and almost
all of this cost was offset by international financial contributions.
